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Casenote

Nothing Lost, Nothing Owed: Supreme
Court Upholds State IOLTA Program in
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington

In a 5-4 decision in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,' the
United States Supreme Court held that a state law that (1) requires
lawyers and limited practitioner officers ("LPOs") to deposit client funds
that cannot otherwise generate net-earning for their clients into an
interest on lawyer's trust account ("IOLTA account") and (2) mandates
that the interest produced on those funds be transferred to a different
owner for a legitimate public use could constitute a per se taking of the
clients' right to that interest, but no compensation is owed to such
clients when they suffer no net loss. 2 The Court reasoned that any
compensation must be measured by the owner's net pecuniary loss
rather than by the value of the taker's gain.3 Conversely, the dissent
argued that the appropriate measure of just compensation is the fair
market value of the property at issue rather than the owner's net

1.
2.
3.

538 U.S. 216 (2003).
Id. at 239.
Id. at 240.
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pecuniary loss, emphasizing that such fair market value should not be
reduced by any administrative or transactional costs to the owner.4
I.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In 1980 Congress passed legislation allowing federally insured banks
to pay interest on negotiable-order-of-withdrawal accounts ("NOW
accounts"). The federal law provides that interest can be paid on
deposits made by individuals and charitable organizations, but not on
deposits made by for-profit corporations or partnerships unless such
deposits are made pursuant to a program under which charitable
organizations are the sole recipients of the interest earned. This
legislation prompted Florida to establish the first statewide IOLTA
program in 1981, permitting the use of NOW accounts for the deposit of
client funds when accumulated interest is used for charitable purposes.
Other states quickly followed Florida's example, and now every state in
the country uses an IOLTA program to help finance legal services for
indigent clients.'
Like many states, Washington instituted its IOLTA program through
the state supreme court.' According to the Washington Supreme Court,
Washington's IOLTA program imposes four basic requirements.7 First,
all client fimds that can earn net interest for the client-i.e., an amount
greater than the costs associated with establishing and administering
the account and disbursing the interest-must be deposited in interestbearing trust accounts.' Second, funds that cannot otherwise earn net
interest for the client must be deposited in an IOLTA account.' Third,
lawyers must instruct the banks to pay the interest on the IOLTA
accounts to the Legal Foundation of Washington ("Foundation").' °

4. Id. at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
5. Id. at 221. Before the federal law was modified in 1980, banks retained the value
of the use of client funds held in non-interest-bearing client-trust accounts. However, due
to the implementation of IOLTA programs, that value is now conveyed to charitable
organizations that provide legal services for the disadvantaged. Reportedly, the aggregate
value of those contributions in 2001 exceeded $200 million. Id. at 222-23.
6. Washington's IOLTA program was established in 1984 when the Washington
Supreme Court amended its Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 223 (citing IOLTA
Adoption Order, 102 Wash. 2d 1101 (1984)).
7. Id. at 224.
8. Id. The Washington Supreme Court stated that in determining whether client
funds should be deposited in an IOLTA account, the lawyer should consider the following
factors: "the amount of interest the funds would earn during the period they are expected
to be deposited, the cost of establishing and administering the account, and the capability
of financial institutions to calculate and pay interest to individual clients." Id. at 225.
9. Id. at 224.
10. Id.
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Fourth, the Foundation must use all funds received from IOLTA
accounts for "tax-exempt law-related charitable and educational
purposes.""
In 1995 the Washington Supreme Court extended its IOLTA rules to
reach LPOs 2 as well as attorneys. 3 Thus, LPOs are bound by the
aforementioned requirements with respect to their clients' funds. Soon
after this 1995 amendment, plaintiffs Allen Brown and Greg Hayes sued
the Foundation and other defendants to enjoin Washington state officials
from continuing to require LPOs to deposit client funds into IOLTA
accounts. Brown and Hayes were real estate investors who regularly
purchased and sold real estate, and in the course of those transactions
transferred funds to LPOs who were required to place them in IOLTA
accounts. To establish standing, each plaintiff identified a specific
transaction in which his money was held in an IOLTA account and
interest earned on it was paid to the Foundation. 4 Plaintiffs alleged
that the state's requirement that the interest earned on their funds in
IOLTA accounts be transferred to the Foundation effected a taking of

11. Id. Upon adopting its IOLTA program, the Washington Supreme Court issued an
order responding to the program's critics. Id. at 225. Opponents of the program claimed
that the program would induce unconstitutional takings of property without just
compensation. Id.at 225-26. The court dismissed this argument, emphasizing that the
program "'creates income where there had been none before, and the income thus created
would never benefit the client under any set of circumstances.'" Id. at 226 (quoting IOLTA
Adoption Order, 102 Wash. 2d at 1108). Others asserted the program would result in
ethical violations by attorneys because attorneys are forced to consider factors other than
their client's best interest when deciding whether to deposit client funds in an IOLTA
account. Id. The court rejected this contention as well, reasoning that the rule "makes it
absolutely clear that the enumerated factors are merely facets of the ultimate question of
whether client funds could be invested profitably for the benefit of clients. If they can, then
investment for the client is mandatory." Id. at 226-27 (quoting Reply Brief of Proponents
at 14, IOLTA Adoption Order, 102 Wash. 2d at 1113-14).
12. LPOs are licensed to serve as escrowees in real estate closings. Though LPOs are
not attorneys, they frequently control the funds of their clients for brief periods of time.
Id. at 227.
13. Id.
14. Hayes and a third party made an earnest money deposit of $2000 on August 14,
1996, and a second deposit of $12,372.32 two weeks later with respect to a real estate
purchase that was closed on August 30, 1996. This money was placed in an IOLTA
account. The parties agreed that the money contained in the IOLTA account generated
some interest that was in part owned by Hayes. In a separate real estate transaction,
Brown made a payment of $90,521.29 on May 1, 1997, which remained in an IOLTA
account for two days. Brown estimated that the interest earned on that deposit amounted
to $4.96. Id.at 229. The Court stated that although the facts were somewhat unclear, the
record suggested that "funds deposited by each of the petitioners generated some interest
that was ultimately paid to the Foundation," and "without IOLTA those funds would not
have produced any net interest for either [Brown or Hayes]." Id. at 230.
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that interest in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs asserted
funds be deposited in IOLTA accounts
that the requirement that client
15
constituted a taking as well.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court
observed that under the state's IOLTA rules, clients were not permitted
to make any net returns on the interest earned in the IOLTA accounts;
if the funds could earn net interest, they should not have been placed in
IOLTA accounts in the first place.'" With that in mind, the court held
that "the constitutional issue focused on what an owner has lost, not
what the [government] has gained."" The court concluded that Hayes
and Brown suffered no loss as a result of the IOLTA program and
accordingly found no constitutional violation."8
Reversing the lower court, a three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the IOLTA program
effected a taking. Significantly, the panel's holding came after the
United States Supreme Court decided in Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundation9 that the interest earned in IOLTA accounts is the private
property of the clients because the clients own the principal that
produced that interest.2 ° The panel took the Phillips holding into
consideration and held that "'the interest generated by IOLTA pooled
trust accounts is property of the clients and customers whose money is
deposited into trust, and.., a government appropriation of that interest
2
for public purposes is a taking entitling them to just compensation.'" 1
The panel explained that "just compensation for the takings may be less
than the amount of interest taken, or nothing, depending on the circumstances,'"
and therefore remanded the case for determination of a
22
remedy.
Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit reconsidered the case en banc. The
en banc majority employed the factor-based approach set out in Penn

15. Id. at 228-29 (citing App. 25). Plaintiffs also alleged that being compelled by the
state to associate with the recipient organizations constituted a violation of their First
Amendment rights. Id. However, neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Supreme Court's
majority addressed that particular claim. Id. at 229.
16. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 94a, Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of
Wash., No. C97-0146C (W.D. Wash. 1998)).
17. Id. (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. at 94a, Wash. Legal Found., No. C97-0146C).
18. Id. (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 94a, Wash. Legal Found., No. C97-0146C).
19. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
20. Id. at 172.
21. 538 U.S. at 230 (quoting Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 236 F.3d
1097, 1115 (2001)).
22. Id. at 230-31 (quoting Wash. Legal Found., 236 F.3d at 1115).
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Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York2" and affirmed the
judgment of the district court.24 In applying the Penn Central analysis,
the majority concluded that plaintiffs suffered no actual loss because
they would not have "earned net interest on their principal deposits"
without the IOLTA program,25 and plaintiffs failed to "show that the
cost of their individual real estate transactions increased as a result of
the IOLTA rules."2" Moreover, the majority reasoned that the program
could not have "interfered with [plaintiffs'] investment-backed expectations" because neither plaintiff "could have expected his principal to earn
a net interest."27 The majority also emphasized that "the IOLTA
regulations are not out of character for either the commercial industry
or the professions they affect."2' Thus, the majority held that no taking
occurred. 29 However, it observed that even if there was a taking, "there
would be no Fifth Amendment violation because the value of their just
compensation is nil."30 The en banc dissent contended that it was
improper for the majority to rely on the Penn Central factor-based
approach because the IOLTA program involved a per se taking rather
than a regulatory taking. Like the three-judge panel that heard the
original appeal, the en banc dissent would have remanded the case for
a determination of whether any compensation was owed. 3'
The United States Supreme Court granted Brown's and Hayes's
petition for certiorari regarding the takings issue.32 A divided Court
narrowly affirmed the Ninth Circuit's en banc holding by a margin of 54.33

II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, "nor
shall property be taken for public use, without just compensation." 34
In analyzing a takings claim, courts must consider: (1) whether the
claimant owned the property at issue; (2) whether the government "took"

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Wash. Legal Found. v. Legal Found. of Wash., 271 F.3d 835, 857-61 (2001).
Id. at 858.
Id. at 860.
Id.
Id. at 861.
Id.
Id. at 864.
Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting).
Brown, 538 U.S. at 231.
Id. at 240.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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that property;
and (3) the amount of compensation owed to the claimant,
35
if any.

A.

Determining Ownership
The Supreme Court has addressed the ownership issue with respect
to interest earned on principal. In Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc. v.
Beckwith, s6 decided in 1980, the Supreme Court determined that
interest follows the principal that produced it, and therefore interest
belongs to the owner of the principal."7 In that case, the plaintiff,
Eckerd's of College Park, Inc. ("Eckerd's") filed an interpleader action in
a Florida state court and tendered approximately $2 million into the
court.3 8

A Florida statute provided that interest earned on an inter-

pleader fund deposited in the registry of the court "'shall be deemed
income of the office of the clerk of the circuit court.'"3 9 Pursuant to
that statute, the clerk of the circuit court retained over $100,000 in
interest accumulated by the deposited interpleader funds.40 Eckerd's
objected to the clerk's retention of that interest.4 Upon a constitutional challenge to the Florida statute, the Court applied the Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York 4 2 factor-based approach and
held that the statute effected a taking, emphasizing that "the earnings
of a fund are incidents of ownership
of the fund itself and are property
43
just as the fund itself is property."
More pertinent here, the Supreme Court in 1998 held in Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation" that interest earned on client funds
held in an IOLTA account was the private property of the client for
purposes of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause. 45 The Court pointed
out that "[w]hile the interest income at issue. . may have no economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition
are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property."'
In
reaching its conclusion, the Court dismissed the argument that the

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232-40 (2003).
449 U.S. 155 (1980).
Id. at 162.
Id. at 156-57.
Id. at 156 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 28.33 (1977) (emphasis omitted)).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 158-59.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. at 164.
524 U.S. 156 (1998).
Id. at 172.
Id. at 170 (citing Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987)).
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interest income constitutes "'government created value. ' "47 The Court
explained that the state does not create value; rather, the client's
principal creates value. 4' The Court further noted that "'the [s]tate's
having mandated the accrual of interest does not mean the [s]tate or its
designate is entitled to assume ownership of the interest." 49 Thus,
under the Court's holdings in Webb's and Phillips,it is clear that clients
whose funds are deposited in IOLTA accounts own the interest
accumulated on those funds.
B. Determining Whether a Taking Occurred
In addition to establishing that he owned the property at issue, a
plaintiff in a takings case must also establish that a taking occurred.50
The drafters of the Constitution made no attempt to define a "taking" of
property. Consequently, over the years, a wide body of case law has
developed in connection with this issue.
Significantly, the Supreme Court distinguishes between "physical"
takings and "regulatory" takings.5 ' With respect to physical takings,
the Court generally applies straightforward, per se rules.52 However,
the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence is generally characterized
by factor-based inquiries." The following decisions demonstrate the
development of the Supreme Court's regulatory takings and physical
takings jurisprudence and provide insight into when a property owner
is entitled to recover compensation for his loss.
1. Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence. In 1922 the Supreme
Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon54 recognized that while the
government may regulate private property to a certain degree, if
regulation "goes too far," it will be considered a taking.5 The Court

47.

Id. at 171.

48. Id.
49. Id. (quoting Webb's FabulousPharmacies,449 U.S. at 162).
50. See Brown, 583 U.S. at 233-35.
51. Id. at 233. Physical takings occur "whenever the government acquires private
property for a public purpose, [regardless of]whether the acquisition is the result of a
condemnation proceeding or a physical appropriation." Id. In contrast, regulatory takings
can occur under particular circumstances when the government promulgates "regulations
that prohibit a property owner from making certain uses of her private property." Id.
52. Id. In other words, when the government physically confiscates private property
for a public use, it is deemed a "physical" taking as a matter of law, and the Court does not
engage in any fact-based inquiry regarding whether such government action constitutes a

taking. Id.
53. Id.
54. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
55. Id. at 415.
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reasoned that "the strong public desire to improve the public condition
is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for a change." 5' The Court held that the
particular facts of each case must be analyzed to determine whether the
boundaries of that implied limitation have been crossed.57 Noting that
one factor to be considered in this analysis is the decrease in property
value resulting from the government regulation, the Court held that
when the diminution of value reaches a certain point, just compensation
is required.58
Expounding on its holding in Pennsylvania Coal Co.,59 the Supreme
Court announced in its 1978 Penn Central6° decision that an ad hoc
factual inquiry was the appropriate method for determining whether a
government regulation resulted in a taking.6' The Court observed that
"a 'taking' may more readily be found when the interference with
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government...
than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
62
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the public interest."
The Court stated that the question of whether a regulatory taking
occurred depends largely on the particular circumstances of the case and
explained that it had been unable to devise a categorical rule with
respect to the issue.63 The Court identified several factors to consider
in the analysis, including: (1) "the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant;" (2) "the extent to which the regulation interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations;" and (3) "the character of the
governmental action."'
In Penn Central, the Court considered those factors in holding that a
building owner who was prohibited from constructing office space above
his building due to a city landmark law need not be compensated.6 5
The Court pointed out that in weighing the factors, it must focus on the
whole parcel and should not limit its analysis to only the affected portion
of the property." The Court explained that takings jurisprudence "does
not divide a single parcel into discrete segments and attempt to

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 416.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id. at 393.
438 U.S. at 104.
Id. at 124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 136-38.
Id. at 130-31.
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determine whether rights in a particular segment have been entirely
abrogated."6 7 Because the property owner was still permitted to use
the rest of his parcel in a productive fashion, and could therefore profit
from the property and
68 obtain a reasonable return on his investment,
there was no taking.
2. Physical Takings Jurisprudence. In 1951 the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Pewee Coal Co.69 that the federal government's
seizure and operation of a private coal mine constituted a physical
taking.70 President Franklin D. Roosevelt had issued an executive
order during World War II authorizing the federal government to seize
and operate coal mines to avert a national strike by coal miners.
Pursuant to that order, the federal government took control of plaintiff's
mine for approximately five months.7 ' Because the government took
physical possession of the property for a public purpose, the Court held
that a taking occurred, which required the government to compensate
the private owner.72
Similarly, in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,7 3
decided in 1982, the Supreme Court held that a state law requiring an
apartment landlord to permit a cable company to install its cable
facilities upon the landlord's property effected a taking.7 4 Plaintiff was
a landlord who had purchased an apartment building and subsequently
discovered that Teleprompter, a cable provider, had placed cable
components on her building. The landlord sued Teleprompter, alleging
that to the extent Teleprompter relied on the state law at issue in
installing its cable facilities on her apartment, the installation constituted a taking. 75 The Court agreed, holding that "a permanent physical
occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the
public interests that it may serve." 7' The Court explained that
"permanent occupations of land by such installations ...

are takings,

even if they occupy only relatively insubstantial amounts of space and

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 130.
Id. at 136.
341 U.S. 114 (1951).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 115-16.
Id. at 115-17.
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Id. at 421.
Id. at 421-24.
Id. at 426.
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do not77seriously interfere with the landowner's use of the rest of [her]
land."
C.

Just Compensation

After a court determines that a taking has occurred, it must consider
how much compensation is owed to the property owner, if any.7s The
following decisions provide guidance for determining the amount that a
property owner should be compensated.
In Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston,79 decided in 1910,
the Court considered how much compensation was owed to landowners
in connection with the government's taking of land to build a public
street.80 The Court explained that the Constitution "merely requires
that an owner of property taken should be paid for what is taken from
him. " " The Court concluded that in determining the proper amount of
compensation, the question hinges on what the owner has lost, not what
the "taker" has gained. 2
In 1926 the Court held in Marion & Rye Valley Railway Co. v. United
States83 that when there was merely a technical taking of a railroad
under the Federal Control Act, no compensation was owed if the
property owner did not suffer a loss.8 President Woodrow Wilson had
been authorized to take possession and assume control of any railroad
as a result of war emergency. Pursuant to that power, President Wilson
issued a general proclamation to the effect that he took possession and
control of each and every railroad system in the country. However, at
no point did he take over the actual possession or operation of plaintiff's
railroad, or interfere with plaintiff's operation of it in any way.85 The
Court held that "even if there was a technical taking... [niothing was
recoverable as just compensation, because nothing of value was taken
from the [property owner]; and [the property owner] was not subjected
by the [g]overnment to pecuniary loss.""'

77. Id. at 430 (citing Lovett v. W. Va. Cent. Gas. Co., 65 S.E. 196 (W. Va. 1909); S.W.
Bell Tel. Co. v. Webb, 393 S.W.2d 117, 121 (Mo. App. 1965)).
78. See Brown, 538 U.S. at 235-40.
79. 217 U.S. 189 (1910).
80. Id. at 193-94.
81. Id. at 195.
82. Id.
83. 270 U.S. 280 (1926).
84. Id. at 282.
85. Id. at 282-83.
86. Id. at 282.
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In Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,8 7 decided in 1949, the
Court provided insight regarding whether nonpecuniary loss should be
compensated.88 The Court considered the amount of compensation
owed to a private laundry company after the U.S. government had taken
over the company's plant for use by the Army during World War II. The
laundry company sought compensation not only for the occupation of its
plant and for damage to the plant's equipment, but also for the
destruction of its "trade routes," i.e., its ability to maintain a business
relationship with the customer base it had acquired through solicitation
prior to the condemnation. 9 In determining whether the company
should be compensated for the loss of its trade routes, the Court noted
that "the value compensable ... is only that value which is capable of
transfer from owner to owner and thus of exchange for some equivalent.
Its measure is the amount of that equivalent."9 ° The Court limited the
laundry's recovery in connection with the trade routes to the amount
that was transferable."' Thus, under the Court's rationale in Kimball,
an owner's nonpecuniary loss that stems from "his unique need for
property or idiosyncratic attachment to it ... is properly treated as part
of the burden of common citizenship," and the owner should not be
compensated for such losses.92

III.
A.

RATIONALE OF THE COURT

The Majority Opinion

Against this background, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Legal
3
Foundation of Washington"
addressed Brown's and Hayes's argument
that Washington's IOLTA program effected a taking of their property.9 4
The Court held that even if a taking occurred, no compensation was
owed. 5 The Court's conclusion rested on two subsidiary issues: (1)
whether the per se approach to takings analysis applied with respect to

87. 338 U.S. 1 (1949).
88. Id. at 3-16.
89. Id. at 3-4, 8.
90. Id. at 5.
91. Id. at 16.
92. Id. (citing Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508-09 (1923));
see Brown, 538 U.S. at 236-67.
93. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
94. Id. at 220-41.
95. Id. at 240.
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and (2)
the IOLTA program rather than the factor-based approach,
96
whether Brown or Hayes suffered actual pecuniary loss.
First, the Court considered whether the per se approach or the factorbased approach applied in determining whether a taking occurred.9 7
The Court noted that Brown and Hayes challenged both the requirement
that their funds be deposited in an IOLTA account (the "deposit requirement") and the requirement that interest gained on their funds be
transferred to the Foundation (the "transfer requirement").98 With
respect to the deposit requirement, the Court explained that it did not
result in the direct confiscation of interest because it was "merely a
transfer of principal."99 Therefore, the Court reasoned that the deposit
requirement "could be viewed as the first-step in a 'regulatory taking,'
which should be analyzed under the [Penn Central TransportationCo.
However, the
v. City of New York' 0l factor-based approach." °1
Court concluded that under the factor-based analysis, there was no
regulatory taking because neither Brown nor Hayes suffered any adverse
economic impact, and the deposit requirement did not interfere with
their investment-backed expectations. 0 2
The Court then stated that the transfer requirement should be
analyzed under the per se approach. 0 3 The Court reasoned that the
per se approach was proper based on its decision in Phillips v.Washington Legal Foundation, ' where it determined that interest earned on
client funds held in IOLTA accounts is the property of the client.'0 5 In
light of Phillips, the Court noted that "the transfer of the interest to the
Foundation... seems more akin to the occupation of a small amount of
rooftop space in Loretto[ 8° ]" than anything else.'0 7 Accordingly, the
Court assumed, arguendo, that: (1) Brown and Hayes retained ownership
of some of the funds that were deposited in the IOLTA accounts, (2)
was taken for
those funds generated some interest, and (3) their interest
1 8
a public use when it was transferred to the Foundation. 1

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 233-39.
Id. at 233-35.
Id. at 234.
Id.
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
Id. (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
Id. at 235.
524 U.S. 156 (1998).
Brown, 538 U.S. at 235 (citing Phillips,524 U.S. at 172).
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
Brown, 538 U.S. at 235 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. 419).
Id.
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Second, the Court considered whether there was any loss for which
Brown and Hayes should be compensated.' °9 The Court reasoned that
Brown's and Hayes's loss should be measured by their net pecuniary loss
rather than the value of the government's gain." ° Consequently, if
Brown's and Hayes's net pecuniary loss was zero, then no compensation
was owed to them.' In addressing the loss issue, the Court confronted the hypotheticals posed by the Ninth Circuit dissenters which demonstrated that lawyers and LPOs sometimes mistakenly place client funds
into IOLTA accounts even though they could have produced net
income." 2 While the hypothetical examples convinced a minority of
the Ninth Circuit that a remand was necessary to determine whether
Brown and Hayes were owed compensation, the Supreme Court was not
persuaded."' The Court explained that Washington's IOLTA rules
"unambiguously require lawyers and LPOs to deposit client funds in
non-IOLTA accounts whenever those funds could generate net earnings
for the client.""' Therefore, if Brown's and Hayes's funds were placed
into IOLTA accounts when they could have produced net income, the
LPOs who deposited their funds violated Washington's IOLTA rules." 5
Thus, any loss to Brown and Hayes resulted from the LPOs' errors and
not any "state action."" 6 The Court observed that while such errors
may have given Brown and Hayes a valid claim against the LPOs, they

109.
110.

Id. at 235-37.
Id. at 237.

111. Id.
112. Id. at 237-38. The Court cited two of the Ninth Circuit dissenters' hypothetical
situations. Id. Under the first hypothetical, one is to assume that $2000 is deposited into
an IOLTA account that pays five percent. After sitting in the account for two days, the
$2000 principal earns approximately $0.55, which is worth less than the cost of the stamp,
envelope, and administrative expenses necessary to deliver the interest to the owner of the
principal. Id. at 237. The Ninth Circuit dissenters concluded that in that case, the client's
financial loss from the taking would be nothing--"[t]he fair market value of a right to
receive [$0.55] by spending [an amount greater than $0.55] to receive it would be nothing.'" Id. at 238 (quoting Wash. Legal Found., 271 F.3d at 883). Thus, according to the
dissenters, no compensation would be owed in that situation. Id. Under the second
hypothetical, one is to assume that $30,000 is deposited into an IOLTA account that pays
five percent. After sitting in the account for six days, the $30,000 principal earns
approximately $29.59, which exceeds the cost of the stamp, envelope, and administrative
expenses necessary to deliver the interest to the owner of the principal. According to the
Ninth Circuit dissenters, the client would be owed compensation under the second
hypothetical. Id. at 238.
113. Id. at 239.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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did not give rise to an action against the state of Washington for
compensation.117
In conclusion, the majority held that a law that compels lawyers and
LPOs to place client funds that could not otherwise produce net earnings
8
into IOLTA accounts does not constitute a regulatory taking."
Though the majority held that the requirement that interest earned on
those funds in IOLTA accounts be transferred to a new owner for a
"legitimate public use" could effect a per se taking, it determined that no
compensation was owed to Brown or Hayes." 9 The majority explained:
"Because [just] compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary
loss-which is zero whenever the Washington law is obeyed-there has
been no violation of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth
Amendment in this case."12 ° Affirming the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals en banc holding,
the Supreme Court held that there was no
121
constitutional violation.
B.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy
and Thomas, authored a dissenting opinion contending that the Court's
prior holdings obligated the Court to hold that Brown and Hayes were
entitled to the fair market value of the interest produced by their funds
held in IOLTA accounts."2 The dissent rejected the majority's defini-

117. Id.
118. Id. at 240.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 240-41.
122. Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy also authored a separate
dissent in which he opined that the IOLTA rules could potentially lead to First Amendment
free-speech violations in addition to Fifth Amendment takings violations. Id. at 253
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy explained that "[b]y mandating that the
interest from [IOLTA] accounts serve causes the justices of the Washington Supreme Court
prefer, the State... grants to itself a monopoly which might then be used for the forced
support of certain viewpoints." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). In other words, the
Washington IOLTA rules require that the interest earned on clients' funds in IOLTA
accounts be transferred to the Legal Foundation of Washington, who may in turn use that
money to finance legal actions that may conflict with the clients' interests or philosophical
beliefs. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted that the IOLTA rules do not
allow clients to opt out of this particular transfer of interest; thus, the clients are in effect
compelled to support a cause they may not agree with, arguably in violation of the First
Amendment. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Because neither the lower courts nor the
majority addressed the First Amendment issue, this Article does not otherwise discuss
Justice Kennedy's dissent.
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tion of "just compensation," which the majority concluded should be
measured by the property owner's net loss."
Specifically, the dissent criticized the majority for "endors[ing]
simultaneously two competing and irreconcilable theories of how that
loss should be measured. " 12 4 According to Justice Scalia, the majority
claimed to agree with the Ninth Circuit en banc majority's approach, i.e.,
that net loss is measured by the amount of interest Brown and Hayes
would have received had their money been placed in non-IOLTA accounts. 125 At the same time, observed Scalia, the majority accepted the
Ninth Circuit en banc dissent's approach, i.e., that net loss is measured
by determining the amount of interest actually accumulated in Brown's
and Hayes's IOLTA accounts and subtracting from that figure the
transaction costs that would be incurred in keeping the interest
themselves. 26 Justice Scalia argued that the majority "cannot have
it both ways ...but even if it could, neither of the two options from
which lower courts may now choose is consistent with Phillips [or other
cases] that equate just compensation with the fair market value of the
property taken."2 7
Justice Scalia noted that under the majority's first theory (which was
consistent with the Ninth Circuit en banc majority's approach), Brown
and Hayes were owed no compensation because pursuant to Washington's IOLTA rules, the only funds that should have been deposited into
IOLTA accounts were those that could not have otherwise generated net
interest.128 Brown's and Hayes's funds could not have produced net
interest had they been placed in non-IOLTA accounts; therefore, this
approach mandated a finding of no net loss.

29

Justice Scalia conclud-

ed that this approach to determining just compensation was unsound. 3 ° Citing Phillips, Justice Scalia pointed out that as soon as
interest was generated on Brown's and Hayes's funds held in IOLTA
accounts, that interest was their property.'3 ' Thus, when the state
transferred the interest to the Foundation, the state should have
compensated Brown and Hayes for the fair market value of that
interest.3 2 Though it may be true that Brown and Hayes could not

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244-45 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 524 U.S. at 168).
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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have earned interest on their funds but for the IOLTA program's deposit
requirement, "just compensation is not to be measured by what would
have happened in a hypothetical world in which ... [Washington's]
33
IOLTA program did not exist."1
Justice Scalia explained that when Washington took possession of
Brown's and Hayes's property-the interest earned on their funds in
IOLTA accounts-and turned it over to the Foundation, that property
had value."M According to Justice Scalia, "[tihe conclusion that it is
devoid of value because of the circumstances giving rise to its creation
is indefensible." 13 5 Moreover, he asserted that the majority, in arriving
at that conclusion, endorsed an argument that was expressly dismissed
in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies,Inc. v. Beckwith 3s -that the interest
income should not be compensated because it constituted government
created value. 3 v Therefore, the significance of the Court's prior
38
holding in Webb's with respect to this issue is now uncertain.1
Indeed, Justice Scalia warned: "[The majority's] endorsement of the
proposition that there is no taking 'when the [sitate giveth, and the
[s]tate taketh away,' has potentially far-reaching consequences. May the
government now seize welfare benefits, without paying compensation, on
the ground that there was no 'net loss' to the recipient?"3 9
Next, Justice Scalia examined the majority's second theory for
explaining why no compensation was owed to Brown or Hayes. Not
surprisingly, he determined that it was flawed as well."4 The majority
reasoned that just compensation should be measured by the amount of
interest Brown and Hayes actually earned on their funds in IOLTA
accounts minus the transactional costs associated with keeping it.'
Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court's holdings in prior takings
cases do not support the use of "net value" to measure just compensa-

133. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
136. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
137. Brown, 538 U.S. at 245 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Webb's, 449 U.S. at 155).
Interestingly, Justice Scalia opted not to directly discuss the Court's recent rejection of this
'government-created value" argument in Phillips, even though he referred to the Phillips
holding extensively throughout his dissent. See Phillips,524 U.S. at 169-70. This Author
submits that Justice Scalia's dissent would have been stronger had he noted and explained
the Phillips holding in connection with this issue in addition to citing the Court's holding
in Webb's.
138. Id. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
139. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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tion, as this approach requires. 14 2 In fact, he noted that "Phillipsflatly
rejected the notion that just compensation may be reduced by transaction costs143the former owner would have sustained in retaining his
property."
Justice Scalia emphasized that the appropriate measure of just
compensation is the fair market value of the property at issue rather
than the owner's "net loss," and fair market value should not be reduced
by any transactional costs to the owner.'" Moreover, he posited that
even if net value were the proper measure of just compensation, the
majority was wrong to conclude that the net value of Brown's and
Hayes's interest was zero. 145 Though the majority correctly, determined
that under Washington's IOLTA rules, Brown and Hayes could not have
earned interest in non-IOLTA accounts, that fact did not affect the
transactional costs that Brown and Hayes would have incurred in
extracting their interest from the IOLTA accounts."
Thus, the
majority "arbitrarily foreclose[d] clients from recovering the 'net interest'
to which (even under
the [majority's] definition of just compensation)
4
they are entitled."
In a display of his distinctive wit, Justice Scalia labeled the takings
that result from IOLTA programs "Robin Hood Takings."" 4
He
characterized this as a new concept in takings jurisprudence "in which
the government's extraction of wealth from [its owners] is so cleverly
achieved, and the object of the government's... beneficence is so highly
favored by the courts (taking from the rich to give to indigent defendants) that the normal rules of the Constitution protecting private
property are suspended."' 41 In concluding his dissent, Justice Scalia
expressed his desire that the majority's ruling be limited to the unique
situation at hand. 9 Indeed, he cautioned that if the rationale that
was embraced by the majority-"what the government hath given, the
government may freely take away"-is
extended any further than this,
5
the result will be devastating.' '

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 249 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170).
at 250 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 250-51 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
at 252 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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IMPLICATIONS

In a practical sense, the most important implication of Brown v. Legal
Foundation of Washington5 2 is that it safeguards state IOLTA programs that provide millions of dollars per year in funding for legal
services to the poor. Significantly, every state in the nation utilizes
these programs for this purpose."5 3 If the Court had struck down the
IOLTA program as unconstitutional, it is not immediately apparent how
states could have redressed such a blow to the funding of indigent legal
services on their own."5 The Court's holding in Brown was a major
triumph for supporters of the IOLTA programs.'55 However, in the
majority's rush to rescue IOLTA programs from the jaws of conservative
opponents, its holding may have created some unintended consequences
as well.
As Justice Scalia observed in his dissent, one negative implication of
the majority's holding is that it may allow the government to avoid
compensating property owners when the government is responsible for
creating the owners' property interests in the first place. 51 Consider,
for instance, Justice Scalia's rather extreme welfare example.' 57
Justice Scalia suggested that the government may now be able to
confiscate an individual's welfare benefits without compensating that
individual on the basis that the individual suffered no net loss because
the state created that property interest. 15 Furthermore, while welfare
benefits are a form of personal property, the Court's holding could
similarly affect takings law in the context of real property. To the
extent the government can demonstrate that it created the value that a
landowner asserts has been taken, the government can argue under
Brown that it need not compensate the landowner because the landowner suffered no net loss.'59 If the government can circumvent the
compensation requirement in such instances, then the government has
free reign with respect to a large category of property.

152. 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
153. Id. at 221.
154. John D. Echeverria, ELR News & Analysis: Regulatory Takings after Brown, 33
ENVTL. L. REP. 10626, 10627 (2003).
155. Id.
156. 538 U.S. at 247 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
157. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
158. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, 2003 SUPREME COURT UPDATE
(Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender 2003).
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Thus, the majority's holding arguably carves out a large exception to
nearly a century's worth of takings jurisprudence. Whether it in fact
does so-as Justice Scalia posited-or does not effect any actual
substantive change-as the majority opined-without a doubt, Brown
will lead to a great deal of litigation over government-created property
interests. This litigation will continue until the new boundaries, if any,
of such takings jurisprudence are sufficiently marked.
Moreover, the majority's holding calls into question the use of fair
market value as the proper standard for measuring the amount of
compensation owed to a takings claimant."6 This too could have
important ramifications.
Under the majority's definition of just
compensation as net loss, transaction costs are taken into account in
determining whether compensation is owed. If the transaction costs
outweigh the actual value of the property taken by the government, then
no compensation is owed. Therefore, it appears, for example, that if the
government took an individual's right to receive payment from debtors,
the government would not have to compensate that individual if it could
prove that the costs the individual would incur in collecting those debts
would outweigh the amount the debtors actually owed to him. This
rather subjective standard seems blatantly inconsistent with basic
notions of fairness, and more importantly, it contradicts the Court's prior
holdings in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation.6 and other
similar cases. I1 2 This aspect of the majority's holding will likely be the
focus of much litigation in the future as well.
The Court could have averted the confusion that will be caused by its
holding in Brown by following the precedent set in Webb's Fabulous
Pharmacies v. Beckwith 6 3 and applying the-Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York" 6 factor-based approach instead of the per
se approach to determine whether a taking was effected by the
requirement that interest earned on funds in IOLTA accounts be
transferred to the Foundation. 1" Had it done so, the Court could have

160. Brown, 538 U.S. at 249-50 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
162. See id. at 170 (noting that "the government may not seize rents received by the
owner of a building simply because it can prove that the costs incurred in collecting the
rents exceed the amount collected"); see also Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255
(1934) (explaining that "it is the property and not the cost of it that is safeguarded by [the]
Constitution").
163. 449 U.S. 155 (1980).
164. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
165. See The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 369, 376
(2003). That article's author asserts that based on Loretto and Webb's, the Penn Central
factor-based approach should have been applied in Brown. The author observes that as a
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held simply that no taking occurred, and thus would have completely
avoided the compensation issue.166 However, the majority did not
choose this route, and as a result, future litigants and courts must deal
with the consequences that follow. Though the positive implication of
the Court's holding in Brown, i.e., the preservation of IOLTA accounts
as a source of financial support for indigent legal services, is certainly
significant in maintaining the flow of the modern legal system, the Court
in retrospect may wish it had taken a different path to save it. The
Court's decision in Brown has opened the door to a new array of
litigation, and it is likely that many years will pass before the dust
finally settles with regard to this aspect of takings law.
ROBERT C. HUGHES, III

result of utilizing the per se approach, the Court's holding in Brown suggests that the
appropriation of money constitutes a per se taking. Id. Consequently, the author states
that "the Court must now find a coherent way to avoid applying [the rule that the
appropriation of money constitutes a taking] to taxes and to other government-created
financial obligations generally recognized as permissible." Id. at 376-77.
166. Id. Arguably, had the majority employed the factor-based analysis, it would have
found no taking. Id. at 378. With respect to the first factor-economic impact-the Court
probably would have determined that the IOLTA program had only a minimal economic
impact on the petitioners, especially in view of the small amounts at issue in this case. Id.
In connection with the second factor-interference with the property owner's investmentbacked expectations-the Court most likely would have concluded that the petitioners'
investment-backed expectations were not affected because, under Washington's IOLTA
provisions, petitioners could not have reasonably expected to earn interest on their
principal. Id. As for the third factor-the character of the government action-the
majority already determined that the IOLTA program at issue was overwhelmingly
beneficial to the public. Brown, 538 U.S. at 232. Such findings would mandate the
conclusion that neither Brown nor Hayes suffered a taking. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
124.

